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Quantum cryptography (QC)1 can provide unconditional secure 
communication between two authorized parties based on the basic principles of 
quantum mechanics2-4. However, imperfect practical conditions limit its 
transmission distance and communication speed. Here we implemented the 
differential phase shift5 (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) with 
up-conversion assisted hybrid photon detector6 (HPD) and achieved 1.3 M bits 
per second secure key rate over a 10-km fiber, which is tolerant against the 
photon number splitting (PNS) attack7,8, general collective attacks on individual 
photons9, and any other known sequential unambiguous state discrimination 
(USD) attacks10,11. 
QC over a fiber link is thought to be the first possible practical applications in 
quantum information research1. Currently high bit rate QKD has attracted more and 
more effort12-19. The main limited ingredient for high speed QKD is the imperfection 
of single photon sources and single photon detectors (SPD) at telecom-band. Three 
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features of SPDs mainly influence their performance: quantum efficiency (QE), 
timing jitter and noise.  
The most commercial detector at telecom band is an InGaAs/InP avalanched 
photo diode (APD), where a photo-excited carrier grows into a macroscopic current 
output via the carrier avalanche multiplication in the APD. The InGaAs/InP APD has 
a fair QE of typically 10%. However fractions of the carriers trapped in the APD can 
trigger additional avalanche and cause erroneous counts, which is well known as 
“afterpulsing”. Thus the APD must be operated at gated mode with a relatively low 
clock frequency. Recently, the InGaAs/InP APD-based SPD has been proved to work 
at a 1 GHz clock rate with the help of self-differential circuit19. However efforts are 
still needed for a higher clock rate. Superconducting single photon detectors have a 
low dark count, a small timing jitter. Thank to these characteristics, it has been used 
in 10 GHz clock system, while its quantum efficiency is as small as 1% and can only 
be operated at a few kelvin17. 
Periodically poled Lithium Niobate (PPLN) waveguide based frequency 
up-conversion SPDs have been proved to work at 10 GHz with a quantum efficiency 
of 8%15. It first up converts a photon at telecom band into a visible photon through a 
non-linear effect, called sum frequency generation (SFG) and then detects the visible 
photon with a Silicon APD. So far, it seems to be the best candidate for high bit rate 
QKD, however the timing jitter of the up-conversion Si APD will get larger with 
count rates increasing. For example in Reference 15, the timing jitter at MHz count 
rates was larger than 1 ns, therefore this type SPD cannot operate at GHz system.   
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On the other hand, as there is no commercial single photon source at 
telecom-band yet1, an attenuated coherent light from a laser is mainly used as the 
source for QKD. While the standard BB84 protocol with an attenuated coherence 
light source will be eavesdropped by a sophisticated PNS attack7,8. In a PNS attack, 
an eavesdropper (Eve) first implements a quantum non-demolition (QND) 
measurement of the photon number in each weak coherent pulse. If the photon 
number is more than one, Eve will keep one in her quantum memory and send the 
others to the receiver through her lossless transmission line. After knowing the 
measurement basis from the public communication, Eve can utilize the same basis to 
measure her stored photon without causing any bit errors. Therefore several PNS 
tolerable protocols have been provided, for example, Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 
protocol20, decoy state BB84 protocol21-23, Bennett 92 protocol with a strong 
reference pulse24,25, the coherence one-way protocol26 and DPS5.  
Here we adopted the DPS protocol and up-conversion assisted hybrid photon 
detectors in the experiment to achieve high bit rate QKD.  
In the DPS protocol5, the sender first encodes one photon in a sequential pulse 
train, randomly sets the relative phase of each pulse in the train as 0 or π, and then 
sends it to the receiver through a fiber link. The receiver uses a 1-bit delay 
Mach-Zehnder interferometer to make the sequential pulses interfere. Each output of 
the MZI is connected to a single photon detector, respectively. The relative phase of 
the sequential pulse decides which detector the photon will go. When one of the 
detectors fires, the receiver can conclude whether the phase is 0 or π according to the 
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which-detector information. The receiver records the phase result and the time 
instance information when he detects a photon. And then the receiver reports the time 
instance information, with which the sender can tell the value of the relative phase. 
Therefore the sender and receiver can share the random phase as the quantum key. 
This protocol is simple but tolerable against all individual attack including the PNS 
attack. A detailed proof can be found in Reference 9. Here we provide a rough 
explanation. 
In the PNS attack, a QND measurement on two consecutive pulses breaks the 
coherence of the pulses, thus brings bit errors. Although Eve can reduce the error 
probability by increasing the number of pulses simultaneously measured by the QND, 
Eve’s information about the key also decreases. Therefore, the information Eve can 
obtain by a PNS attack is limited by 2μ9, where μ is the average photon number per 
pulse.  
For general individual attacks, we supposed that Eve could implement an 
optimal measurement attack, where the collision probability for each bit is  
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where e  was the innocent system error. Then considering a twofold attack 
composed of a PNS attack and an optimal measurement attack, an upper bound for 
the collision probability for n-bit will be9 
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As the compression factor τ with privacy amplification was calculated as 
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PC2log−=τ , the secure key rate SER  was reduced from the sifted key rate SIR  as 
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where )(ef  characterized the performance of the error correction algorithm. When a 
SPD was operated at a free-running mode, the sift key rate could be written as15  
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where ν , T , η , dt  were repetition rate, channel transmission efficiency, 
detector’s quantum efficiency and dead time of the detection system. In order to 
achieve high bit rate QKD, we need high clock rate ν  and quantum efficiency η .  
Here we utilized periodically poled Lithium Niobate (PPLN) waveguide based 
up-conversion hybrid photon detectors in the experiment. We mixed the signal photon 
with strong pumping light at 980 nm in a wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) 
coupler and sent them to a fibre pigtailed PPLN waveguide for a SFG25,26. This device 
could convert the 1510 nm signal to a 600 nm sum frequency output with an internal 
conversion efficiency of 99%. The generated 600 nm photon will go through a short 
pass dispersive prism to eliminate the pumping light and its second harmonic. At last 
the generated photon will be detected by a HPD. 
The HPD6 incorporated an avalanched diode (AD) into a vacuum tube to receive 
and amplify the photoelectron from its cathode. In our case, the photon first injected 
into the GaAsP cathode (ф3mm effective area) and generated a photoelectron. The 
photoelectron was then accelerated by –8,500 V bias and focused onto the ф1mm AD, 
which is 400 V biased. Then, the electron deposited its kinetic energy in the AD and 
produced thousands of electron hole pairs, which was called an electron bombarded 
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gain. The generated electrons were drifted in the AD, and further multiplied by ten to 
hundred times by impact ionization. The total gain was the multiplication of these two 
gains beyond 105. The quantum efficiency of the HPD at 600 nm was about 25% and 
the dark count was 1000 Hz. The capacity of the AD was 3.4 pF, so that the rising and 
falling times were both less than 400 ps.   
The up-conversion detector’s overall quantum efficiency and noise could be 
controlled by adjusting the pumping laser of the up-conversion detector as was shown 
in Figure 1 (a). The noise counts were mainly from the parasitic nonlinear processes 
in the waveguides and the input fiber25,26. We also measured the timing jitters of the 
up-conversion detectors at high-count rates with a 10 ps pulse input, as shown in 
Figure 1 (b). From the graph, we could tell that the full width at tenth maximum 
(FWTM) was less than 200 ps even at 10 MHz count rates for both detectors.  
The experimental setup was as shown in Figure 2. A CW laser was first 
modulated into 2 GHz pulse train by a LiNbO3 intensity modulators (IM), with a 
pulse duration of 70-ps full width at half maximum (FWHM), 500-ps time interval 
and a central wavelength of 1550 nm. The IM was driven by a 14 GHz pulse pattern 
generator (PPG). A 3 GHz pulse pattern generator drove a pseudo random number 
sequence into a phase modulator to encode the pulse train.  
We attenuated the encoded pulse train by around 80 dB and set the average 
photon number per pulse as 0.2, which is the optimal value for the secure key 
generation rate15. Then we sent the encoded, attenuated pulse through a 10-km 
dispersion shifted fibre (DSF), which has zero dispersion at 1550-nm band so that the 
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chromatic dispersion induced pulse broadening was negligible compared to the 
detector’s timing jitter, to the receiver. The receiver used a 1 GHz, 1-bit delay Mach 
Zehnder interferometer27 (MZI) to interfere the sequential pulse. Each out put of the 
MZI is directly connected with an up-conversion assisted HPD, respectively. When 
detector 0 fires, the receiver will know the phase between the two interfered pulses is 
0. Similarly, when detector 1 fires, the phase will be π. Therefore whenever the 
receiver get a detection instance, he and the sender can share a random bit.  
 The output signals of the up-conversion HPD were first sent to a GHz amplifier 
and a ps timing discriminator for amplification and pulse shaping, and then went to 
the time interval analyser (TIA) to record the detection time instances and 
which-detector information. Therefore, the receiver achieved his random key.  
In our experiment, to achieve Mega-bit secure key over 10 km fiber, we set a 
quantum efficiencies of the detectors as 4% and the noise count rates as 30 kHz with 
120 mW pump power. We chose a time window of 280 ps and the noise count rate per 
window was 8.4×10-6. Since the timing jitter (FWTM) of the up-conversion assisted 
HPD, shown in Fig. 1(b), was less than 200 ps even at 10 MHz count rate, the 
quantum efficiency reduced to 75% at most and there was no error due to tail. The 
baseline error of the system is about 1% due to the imperfection of the MZI.   
In the experiment, sifted keys were actually generated between the sender and 
receiver, and the error rate was measured by directly comparing the sender’s key with 
the receiver’s. For each data point described below, we undertook five runs of QKD 
sessions, and the error rates and sifted key rates were the averages of the five runs, as 
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was shown in Figure 3. The secure key rates were calculated by putting the 
experimentally obtained error rates and sifted key rates in equation (3) using the 
experimental results for the sifted key generation rates and bit error rates. The sender 
and receiver were located in the same room and we performed 10-km fiber 
transmission experiment using fiber spools, while other additional data were taken 
with an optical attenuator simulating fiber loss.  
Figure 4 showed the theoretical curves and experimental results for the sifted and 
secure key generation rate as a function of fiber length. In the figure, the secure key 
rate with a 10 km fibre was 1.34 M bits per second and the error rate was 1.5%, 1% 
due to the MZI’s imperfection and 0.5% due to the noise count. We observed that the 
theoretical curves fitted very well with the experimental data except for the last data 
point, whose error rate was already nearby the security threshold 4.1%.  
Our system was also secure against the sequential USD attacks because this type 
attack do not have any advantage over the individual attacks at lower channel loss 
condition10,11,17. The basic idea of USD attack is that Eve has a local oscillator 
phase-locked to the coherent laser source of the sender and with a probability of 
)2exp(1 μ−− , she can unambiguously measure the phase between the sequential 
pulses. Till now, the most powerful USD attack is a sequential attack with the 
intensity modulation11. With our experimental parameter, we can calculate that all the 
data points we had taken are all secure against this type attack, except for the data 
point with the distance of 35 km. Furthermore, according to the experimental 
parameter, the compression factors in the USD attack with the intensity modulation is 
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bigger than those in the optimal individual attack, which means the optimal individual 
attack provide the tightest bound in our experiment. 
 The above results showed that the quantum cryptography system we implemented 
achieved Megabits secure key rate over 10 km fibre link, which was tolerable to all 
individual attacks including the PNS attack and all known USD attacks. We hope it 
would be operable in a standard telecommunication network soon. To extend the 
Megabits system to longer distance, we could reduce the noise counts caused by the 
parasitic nonlinear process by using an 1810 nm pump28. To achieve higher bit rate, 
we could either develop special cathode for the SFG wavelength, 600 nm in our case, 
to 50%, or reduce the cathode thickness to improve the timing jitter. 
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Figure Captions: 
Figure 1 Performance of an up-conversion assisted HPD. (a) Quantum efficiency and noise count 
rates as a function of pump power. (b) Timing jitter as a function of different count rates.  
Figure 2 A schematic drawing of the experiment set-up. The 3 GHz pulse pattern generator (PPG) 
has two outputs, pseudo random number from data output and 3 MHz synchronized signal from 
synchronization output. The data output is connected to the phase modulator (PM), while the 
synchronized signal is used as the start signal of the time interval analyser (TIA). To achieve the 
perfect phase modulation, a delay line was used to adjust the delay between the laser pulse and the 
electric pulse of the random number in the PM. The 1 GHz amplifier and timing discriminator 
were used to amplify the output signals of the up conversion HPDs and formulate standard NIM 
signal as the inputs to the logic gate. The logical OR signal of the two detectors is used as the stop 
signal of the TIA.  
Figure 3 Sift key rate (a) and bit error rate (b) of our system as a function of the transmission 
distance. The 10-km data points were achieved with experimental fiber transmission for both 
graphs, while other points were with attenuation simulated fiber loss. The curves corresponded to 
the theoretical predictions with the experimental parameters we set.  
Figure 4 Secure key rate of our system as a function of the transmission distance. The 10-km data 
points were achieved with experimental fiber transmission. The curves corresponded to the 
theoretical predictions with the experimental parameters we set, while the data point was 
calculated from the experimentally measured sift key rate and bit error rate.  
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